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Abstract 
We usually manoeuvre through our environment so effortlessly that the complexity of 
voluntary movement is taken for granted. Most of the time the processes involved in 
running for the morning bus, flipping through the pages of a magazine, or cutting a 
rug on the dance floor never cross our mind…that is, unless something goes wrong. 
An embarrassing trip or stumble is what usually draws attention to our movements. 
But, even then, how much insight do we really have about what we just did? And how 
is it that we can normally be so oblivious, yet still move effectively? In this article we 
review recent experimental research in healthy individuals and patients with abnormal 
motor awareness, in order to explain how they can help us to better understand our 
own movements. 
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So you think you can dance? An example of good intentions and poor awareness 
in the motor system 
 You sit poised in front of the television, waiting eagerly to watch your 
favourite celebrity perform his well-practiced waltz. After months of rehearsal his 
time to shine has arrived at last. All eyes are on him – The Dancer – and he intends to 
be nothing short of dazzling. The music begins and he starts to move. You hold your 
breath…and stare in horror as his dance steps, far from being graceful, resemble that 
of a newborn deer with two left feet and the timing of a drunk. The audience, partly 
sympathising but unable to look away, cannot help but ask the question: “How can 
people be so deluded!?”  
This astonished cry is often heard when people watch celebrities or member of 
the public showcase an apparent lack of singing or dancing talent on prime-time 
television. Of course, the question does not refer to a belief that the performer is 
suffering from a genuine psychotic episode (i.e. a loss of contact with reality), but 
rather utter disbelief that anyone could be so oblivious about the inadequacy of their 
own performance. But how is it possible to be so deluded about one’s abilities? The 
answer may lie in how we control and monitor our body movements, and thus our 
behaviour more generally. 
-------------------------------- 
Figure 1 about here 
-------------------------------- 
Over the past decade or so a substantial body of research has demonstrated 
that our intentions to move not only determine what kind of action we are going to 
perform, but also influence our awareness and monitoring of the same action. Take as 
an example the aforementioned dancer performing his waltz. We can explain the 
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processes involved in this action using a ‘computational’ model of the motor system, 
developed using engineering principles and adapted for use in psychology (Wolpert, 
1997; figure 1). The process begins with the instructions (or motor commands) needed 
to perform each intended movement being created in the brain. Sensory information is 
used to ensure that these motor commands are appropriate for the intended task. For 
example, the visual appearance of an object affects the motor commands generated 
(i.e. you would not plan to lift your dance partner using the same technique you use to 
lift your trophy). These motor commands instruct different target muscles to contract 
and relax in order to produce the desired movement (e.g. a step forward). In turn, the 
movement is detected by sensors located in the body (e.g. the foot and leg), and these 
provide sensory feedback to the brain regarding the actual movement that has taken 
place.  
Now you would be forgiven for thinking that our dancer decides whether or 
not he is gliding gracefully around the ballroom based solely on this sensory 
information, but you would be wrong. In actual fact, so long as his overall goal is met, 
and he makes it through the dance without a major trip, slip or fall, his appreciation of 
his own waltz moves would depend mostly on his prior intentions.  
How does this happen? Well, the computational model of the motor system 
further suggests that at the time when the original instructions (or motor commands) 
for the intended movement are created, a duplicate of these commands or ‘efference 
copy’ is produced. This efference copy is used to predict the expected sensory 
feedback of the intended movement, and our conscious awareness relies on these 
predictions. By relying on intentions and predictions, we are able to perform fluent 
movements without the inherent delay of the sensory feedback system. We become 
aware of a movement error retrospectively, only when a large discrepancy is detected 
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between the expected and actual sensory feedback. Performing such comparisons and 
detecting possible mismatches is an important component of action monitoring and 
learning (Fink et al., 1999). Consciousness is potentially called in to assist with the 
task; however, so long as such discrepancies are small and our initial goals are met, 
the system is able to make slight corrections and update its predictions without 
bothering the awareness system. Under these circumstances awareness simply 
remains loyal to the information provided by our initial motor intentions. Applying 
these principles to our dancer, we would normally expect him to perform each step 
without paying attention to the sensory feedback being received about his clumsiness, 
provided that on the whole his intentions continue to be met. This explains why small 
failures in performance remain undetected.  
Good intentions and poor awareness in the healthy motor system. 
Experiments with healthy participants provide convincing evidence that the 
motor system operates in the manner described by the model above. For example, 
research by Gandevia and colleagues (Gandevia, Smith, Crawford, Proske & Taylor, 
2006; Smith, Crawford, Proske, Taylor & Gandevia, 2009), has shown that motor 
commands (or instructions) inform body awareness. In particular, Gandevia et al 
(2006) found that when sensory (i.e. proprioceptive) feedback about the position of 
ones arm is blocked (by temporarily anaesthesia), healthy individuals are still able to 
sense the position of the limb using information from motor commands. 
One of the first experimental studies to directly demonstrate our limited 
awareness of actual movements and reliance on intentions was performed by 
Fourneret and Jeannerod (1998). They simply asked participants to draw a straight 
between two points shown on a computer display. However, the participants could not 
see their movements directly because their hands were concealed beneath a table. 
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Participants instead viewed a dot on the computer display, which represented the 
movement being performed. Unbeknownst to the participants, on some occasions the 
computer systematically shifted the direction of the dot slightly to the left or right of 
the actual position of the hand under the table. Therefore, in order to reach the visual 
target participants had to move their actual unseen hand in the direction opposite to 
the dot. Thus, drawing a line between the two points required participants to make 
hand movements that deviated between 0 and 10 degrees to the left or right of an 
actual straight line. Remarkably, when later asked about their performance on the 
task, participants had no conscious awareness that their hand movements were off 
target, and largely reported having drawn straight lines. Despite other sources of 
sensory feedback (i.e. proprioception) providing conflicting information about the 
actual movement being performed, awareness was dominated by visual feedback in 
this task. Subsequent research has replicated this finding, and shown that we only 
become aware of errors on this kind of task if the discrepancy between vision and 
proprioception exceeds 15 degrees, indicating a substantial deviation from our 
intended movement (Franck et al., 2001).  
Applying these findings to our ballroom dancing friend, we can begin to 
understand his failure to notice when his movements are not executed with precision. 
It turns out motor awareness is not simply a matter of sensory feedback, and that 
ignoring errors in performance is (to some extent) perfectly normal, provided that our 
intended goal is achieved. However, following brain-injury it is possible to be 
unaware of even large failures in performance. It is to these brain-injured patients that 
we now turn, and consider how devastating motor difficulties sometimes fail to 
capture awareness.  
Good intentions and poor awareness in brain-injured patients. 
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 One of the most unfortunate and easily recognisable consequences of a stroke 
is complete or partial paralysis on one side of the body. People are, therefore, often 
surprised to hear that a proportion of patients with paralysis or weakness after stroke 
exhibit an apparent inability to recognise or appreciate such difficulties. This curious 
disorder, called anosognosia for hemiplegia (AHP), means that patients may attempt 
to get out of their bed/wheelchair, stand, or walk, despite a total inability to perform 
these actions. When asked about their motor ability, some AHP patients will 
vehemently deny the existence of any problem, and even go so far as to claim they 
have demonstrated their ability to move their paralysed limb (for a more detailed 
account see Orfie et al. 2007; Jenkinson & Fotopoulou, 2009). For example, Cocchini, 
Beschin and Della Sala describe a patient with persistent AHP who, despite complete 
paralysis of the left-half of his body, would offer to “jump out of the car to buy the 
newspaper” (Cocchini et al., 2002, p.2030). Similarly, Venneri and Shanks (2004) 
report an AHP patient who claimed she could walk, but when asked to demonstrate 
this ability by walking to greet visitors, would reply “Yes, I could get up to meet 
them, but the doctor says it would be better if I rested” (Venneri & Shanks, 2003, 
p.230). 
 Aside from arousing general interest in clinicians, patients with AHP provide a 
unique opportunity to delve into the mechanisms underlying normal awareness. Of 
particular relevance to the current article is the extent to which AHP can be utilised to 
evaluate the above model of the motor system, and in doing so explain how it is 
possible for individuals (both healthy and brain-injured) to be unaware of movement 
errors (see Frith, Blakemore & Wolpert, 2000, and later; Berti & Pia, 2006; Berti et 
al., 2007). What distinguishes patients with AHP from everyone else is their apparent 
inability to notice even large discrepancies between their intended and actual actions. 
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Due to their lesions, it appears that when a discrepancy occurs, the motor system of 
these patients continues to operate by deceiving awareness and relying exclusively on 
the intended movement. AHP patients therefore continue to believe they are moving 
normally, because they are led astray by their intentions. This process can be easily 
understood if we consider similar examples from our everyday behaviour – think 
about how many times you intended to do something, were sure you had done it, and 
later discovered that you did not? It is a scenario familiar to us all: for example, you 
believe you send that email to your boss on Friday night as you intended, but find out 
on Monday morning that you did not. Alternatively, you get home from a hard day at 
work to discover that, despite your intention this morning, Snowball (your beloved 
kitty) went hungry again today, because you failed to feed him. Likewise, patients 
with AHP believe the movement they planned and intended to make has been 
completed successfully, but unlike people without AHP, they fail to discover that their 
initial belief was false. Unfortunately, few experimental studies have attempted to 
evaluate this explanation of AHP; that is, until recently… 
As stated above, AHP may occur because patients retain the capacity to plan 
intended movements, and mistake these for actual movement. Because the planning, 
initiation, execution and monitoring of voluntary movement involves different various 
stages and brain regions (Grèzes & Decety, 2001), it is possible for patients with 
paralysis to be able to plan movements that are actually impossible for them to 
execute (Johnson, 2000; Johnson, Sprehn, & Saykin, 2002). However, the question of 
whether patients with AHP also retain this crucial ability was only examined recently 
by Jenkinson, Edelstyn & Ellis (2009). They performed the first study to examine 
whether AHP patients are capable of planning (i.e. creating an internal representation 
or simulating) movements that they cannot perform.  
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Jenkinson et al (2009) took an existing measurement of motor representations 
(Johnson, 2000) and applied it to the novel context of patients with AHP. The 
procedure involves patients first being asked to say how they would (hypothetically) 
grasp an object (e.g. a door-handle) with their paralysed arm, and then being asked to 
actually perform the same action with their unaffected hand. The accuracy of a 
patient’s ability to simulate/plan movements can be determined by calculating the 
degree of consistency between these two sources of information.  
The results of Jenkinson and colleagues’ experiment showed that AHP 
patients retain the ability to generate relatively accurate simulations of their intended 
movements, even those that are impossible to perform (i.e. those involving the 
paralysed arm). This ability did not differ from that of hemiplegic control patients 
without anosognosia, ruling out the possibility that impairment motor planning might 
directly account for AHP. However, this finding supports the idea that the ability to 
mentally represent an intended movement is possible in patients with AHP. Whether 
this representation of intended movements is key to the illusory sense of movement in 
AHP was the focus of a separate study by Fotopoulou et al (2008). 
Fotopoulou et al. (2008) used a prosthetic rubber hand to examine the role of 
the intention to move in the illusory sense of movement experienced by patients with 
AHP. Based on the above model of the motor system, Fotopoulou and colleagues 
reasoned that the false sensation of having moved the paralysed limb would be related 
to whether or not AHP patients intended to move. That is, patients should only believe 
they have moved their arm when they had the intention to do so, and observing 
movement of the limb without this accompanying intention should not result in a false 
sense of movement.  
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The researchers substituted the patient’s own paralysed hand for a prosthetic in 
order to provide false visual feedback of the paralysed limb moving (or not) without 
affecting the patient’s sense of touch. Thus, patients believed that they were looking at 
their own hand, when in fact they were seeing a lifelike prosthetic. At the same time 
patients were asked to voluntarily move their hand (intention present), not move their 
hand (intention absent), or the prosthetic hand was moved passively by a second 
experimenter (intention absent). The remarkable finding of this experiment was that 
the AHP patients only believe they had moved their hand when the intention to do so 
was present, and ignored the motionless hand they could see. In other words, despite 
watching a left hand they thought was their own remain still, patients believed they 
were moving! These false claims were not made in trials when the intention to move 
was absent (i.e. when expecting the experimenter to move their arm or for no 
movement to occur), with AHP patients freely admitting that ‘their hand’ had not 
moved in such instances. Furthermore, a group of control hemiplegic patients without 
AHP did not experience this same illusory sense of movement even when they 
intended to move. These findings support the suggestion that intended motor 
representations play a crucial role in producing the illusory sense of movement 
experienced by patients with AHP. Furthermore, the combined findings of Fotopoulou 
et al (2008) and Jenkinson et al (2009) have implications for our understanding  of 
everyday motor awareness in healthy individuals.  
The best laid schemes o’ mice an’ men (Gang aft agley). 
To come full-circle and bring this article to an end, we can use all of what we 
have learnt so far to try and better understand our good-intentioned, celebrity dancer. 
By looking at the normal motor system we have established that awareness is usually 
based on what we intend to do, rather than what we have actually done. A tendency to 
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ignore small performance errors is perfectly normal (Fourneret & Jeannerod, 1998; 
Wolpert, 1997). It should therefore come as no surprise that our dancer fails to notice 
minor errors in his performance.  
We can further explain a failure to detect larger errors in movement by 
drawing on the extreme example of AHP. This pathology of awareness has confirmed 
that motor representations and intentions exert considerable influence over awareness 
(Fotopoulou et al., 2008; Jenkinson et al., 2009), and that the motor system can 
deceive us into believing we have executed our intended actions correctly, even when 
there is overwhelming evidence to the contrary. What we observe in our apparently 
self-deluded dancer may, in fact, be a mild version of this faulty mechanism of 
awareness. Of course, the similarities we have draw between AHP and our 
hypothetical dancer are exaggerated; though, the underlying principles remain faithful 
to the usual operation of the motor system, and allow us to demonstrate how studying 
individuals with brain-injury can reveal the workings of a healthy mind (see Ellis & 
Young, 1996; Rapp, 2001). Thus, through no fault of his own, our dancer friend may 
be completely oblivious and unable to possess knowledge about his awful 
performance. After all, he had all of the right intentions! 
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Figure Captions 
 
Figure 1. A simple model of the motor system. 
 
 
